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The Effectiveness of State Legislation in Mitigating Moral Hazard:  
Evidence from Automobile Insurance 
 
ABSTRACT 
  Insurance fraud, which adds an estimated $85 billion per year to the total 
insurance bill in the U.S., is an extremely serious problem for consumers, 
regulators, and insurance companies. This paper analyzes the effects of state 
legislation and market conditions on automobile insurance fraud from 1988 to 
1999, a period representing a substantial increase in the enactment of antifraud 
legislation. Our empirical results show that the laws have mixed effects; two laws 
have no statistically significant effect on fraud. The strongest evidence of fraud 
mitigation effects are associated with mandatory Special Investigation Units, 
classification of insurance fraud as a felony, and mandatory reporting of 
professionals to licensing authorities. However, laws requiring insurers to report 
potentially fraudulent claims to law enforcement authorities increase fraud, which 
may reflect some substitution from more efficacious private efforts to less 





  Insurance fraud is one of the most serious problems facing insurers, insurance consumers, 
and regulators. Fraud increases the cost of insurance, threatens the financial strength of insurers, 
and negatively affects the availability of insurance. The Coalition Against Insurance Fraud 
(1996) estimates that the cost of insurance fraud in the U.S. is as high as $85 billion per year. 
Carroll, Abrahamse, and Vaiana (1995) estimate that more than one third of people hurt in 
automobile accidents exaggerate their injuries, which have added $13 to $18 billion to America’s 
annual insurance bill in 1993. 
  In the face of significant costs associated with insurance fraud, many states have enacted 
a wide variety of laws and regulations to reduce it. These statutes and antifraud activities include 
increasing penalties for insurance fraud, devoting more funds to detection and prosecution of 
insurance fraud, and implementing regulations requiring insurers and insurance regulators to 
devote more resources to reduce insurance fraud. Between 1988 and 1999, 43 states enacted 124 2 
new antifraud statutes. Although antifraud and tort reforms have been promoted as important 
elements in the fight against insurance fraud, the actual impact of these laws on moral hazard is 
unclear. These laws may have no effect, could achieve the desired effect of reducing fraud, or 
could even have unintended consequences that increase insurance fraud.  
  Despite the significant change in the regulatory environment over these 12 years and the 
substantial variation in statutes and antifraud activities across the states, no academic study has 
assessed the effectiveness of these statutory efforts directed at reducing insurance fraud. This 
study measures the effect of these efforts on the level of automobile insurance fraud. 
  Our study utilizes regression analysis to evaluate the relationship between the level of 
insurance claim fraud and antifraud fraud statutes. Our measure of insurance fraud is the ratio of 
auto injury losses to auto property damage losses. Using state-level panel data between 1988 and 
1999, we regress this fraud proxy variable on a set of insurance fraud and tort reform statutes, 
market structure characteristics, and other variables to assess their effects on fraudulent auto 
insurance claims. The results of our analysis should prove valuable to regulators, insurers, 
legislators, and consumers in focusing the continued efforts to mitigate insurance fraud through 
regulatory and statutory changes at the state level. 
  This analysis is presented as follows. First, Section 2 describes the variables used in the 
study and develops hypotheses about how the legislative and market structure variables may 
affect automobile insurance fraud. Sections 3 and 4 present the empirical model and the results 
of our empirical estimation, respectively. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
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2. DATA AND HYPOTHESES  
  We use state-level data from 1988 to 1999 for two reasons. First, we start in 1988 
because the Insurance Research Council (IRC), which provides the data for our dependent 
variable, did not provide the data before that year. Second and more important, this period is the 
most relevant for analyzing this issue because it covers a significant change in the legal 
environment as states aggressively implemented antifraud statutes. Figure 1 plots the number of 
states that adopted six antifraud laws during the sample period. In 1988, fewer than 10 states had 
enacted any of these laws. During the next decade the number of states adopting each of these 
laws increased quickly and substantially. Two laws that existed in no state in 1988 (laws that 
establish special investigation units and require states to revoke professional licenses in the event 
of insurance fraud) were used in 16 and 7 states, respectively, by 1999. In 1988, the three most 
frequently used laws—requiring insurance companies to report potential fraud, instituting a fraud 
bureau, and instituting a felony for insurance fraud—were each used in ten or fewer states. By 
the end of our sample each law was used in about 35 states.  
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
A. Insurance Fraud 
  Moral hazard is present when claimants’ behavior affects the amount of insured losses, 
and claimants have information about the value of losses that is not available to insurers. 
Insurance fraud occurs when moral hazard entices a claimant to inflate the value of a loss by 
deceiving an insurer. 
  Insurance fraud is often divided into two categories based on when the intent to defraud 
an insurer arose. The most egregious type of fraud is planned before the occurrence of a loss. For 
example, several instances of “fraud mills” have been exposed by law enforcement in recent 4 
years. A “fraud mill” is a network of attorneys and physicians that stage low-speed automobile 
collisions to bill insurance companies for unnecessary and fictitious medical procedures. Many 
other elaborate schemes have been designed and implemented to defraud insurers.
1  
  The more common form of insurance fraud occurs after a legitimate accident. This ex-
post fraud involves unnecessary build-up or overstatement of claim costs (Dionne and St.-
Michel, 1991; Dionne, St. Michel, and Vanasse, 1993). The Insurance Research Council surveys 
(1991, 1995) uncovered a surprising public tolerance for dishonesty in insurance claiming. 
According to the surveys, many consumers believe it is acceptable to exaggerate the cost of an 
accident to offset a deductible or make up for premiums paid in past periods when no claims 
were filed. 
  Insurance fraud is hard to measure because it is difficult to detect. Because no direct 
measure of insurance fraud is available, we use a proxy that we expect to be highly correlated 
with insurance fraud. The proxy is the ratio of average loss cost per insured car for all injury 
coverages combined to average loss cost per insured car for property damage coverage.  
  Moral hazard can only arise when the claimant has information about the distribution of 
damages that is not available to the insurer. If the insurer can objectively verify all damages, it 
will only pay the verified amount. When the insurer cannot observe the actual value of damages, 
the claimant can inflate damages by deceiving the insurer. Therefore, moral hazard in insurance 
claims is most likely to affect bodily injury losses because some portion of these losses is 
difficult to verify objectively. For example, whiplash and other soft tissue injuries cannot be 
detected by objective procedures like x-rays. The existence and severity of soft tissue injuries 
can only be evaluated based on statements made by the claimant. Therefore, once we control for 
                                                      
1Examples of insurance fraud schemes are described online by the Coalition Against Insurance Fraud at 
http://www.insurancefraud.org/stats_set.html. 5 
other factors that could affect claiming behavior, differences across states and periods in injury 
losses should be highly correlated with insurance fraud. Property damage loss is the appropriate 
denominator because it approximates the universe of potential bodily injury losses (Cummins 
and Tennyson, 1996). It is very rare for bodily injury to occur in the absence of property 
damage.
2 
  This fraud proxy is most similar to the dependent variable used by Cummins and 
Tennyson (1996), who find that the ratio of the frequency of bodily injury claims to the 
frequency of property damage claims is positively related to opinions regarding the morality of 
fraudulent insurance acts in a state. 
  Carroll and Abrahamse (2001) also employ a fraud proxy similar to our proxy. They use 
closed claims data to compare claiming patterns involving hard injuries to those involving soft 
injuries. Hard injuries are defined as those such as bone fractures and lost limbs that can be 
objectively verified. Soft injuries include soft tissue damage such as whiplash, sprains and 
strains. Soft injuries are harder to verify because the diagnosis is subjective and relies on 
information provided by the injured party. Carroll and Abrahamse (2001) compare the ratio of 
hard injury claims to soft injury claims across states with various regulatory regimes. They find 
evidence consistent with fewer soft injury claims relative to hard injury claims in states where 
regulation is less conducive to bringing a liability suit. Dionne and St-Michel (1991) find that 
injured workers miss more days of work due to injuries like lower back pain that are difficult to 
verify objectively than workers with verifiable injuries like bone fractures. They attribute this 
result to moral hazard. 
                                                      
2 Automobile collisions with pedestrians are exceptions to this argument. However, pedestrian injuries 
constitute a small fraction of bodily injury losses. 6 
  Following the reasoning described above, we assume that the ratio of potentially 
fraudulent bodily injury losses to the universe of potential losses (estimated by property damage 
losses that are generally more conducive to objective verification) will be highly correlated with 
the level of insurance fraud in a state. 
  Other studies have used different measures of fraudulent insurance claims. Some have 
used conviction rates and other outcome-based measures to proxy for the fraud (Derrig and 
Zicko, 2002). While appropriate for evaluating prosecutorial efforts relative to allegations of 
fraud, this measure is less appropriate for this study, which also aims to measure fraud that goes 
unpunished. If all perpetrators of insurance fraud were subsequently convicted, moral hazard in 
insurance claiming would not be a problem worthy of great attention. Thus, such measures are 
likely biased downward from the actual fraud rate as defined in this study.  
  The Insurance Research Council provides the state-level claims information we use to 
calculate our fraud proxy. Figure 2 displays the trend of our fraud proxy during the sample period. 
It increases about 27% from 1988 until 1992, and decreases rapidly thereafter. The value in 1999 
is over 36% less than it was in the peak year. This pattern is very similar to the overall trend in 
crime rates, which grew significantly in the late 1980s, peaked in 1991, and dropped 
precipitously since then.  
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
B. Antifraud Legislation 
  We estimate the effect of six laws that are designed to mitigate moral hazard. Although 
the wording of each law differs slightly across states, the general form and meaning of each is 
consistent with the Model Insurance Fraud Act proposed by the Coalition Against Insurance 
Fraud (CAIF). For each law we record the year it was first enacted. Information about insurance 7 
fraud statutes for each state is obtained from the CAIF and a search of Lexis. The first three 
statutes described below, Warning, Mandatory Reporting, and Special Investigation Unit, require 
private sector action by insurance companies. The last three, Felony, Fraud Bureau, and License, 
require action by public authorities including law enforcement and insurance regulators.
3 
  The first antifraud variable, labeled Warning, requires insurers to print a warning on 
application and claim submission forms defining insurance fraud and stating that it is a crime. In 
1999, 22 states had warning laws. The standard language of the warning is: 
“It is a crime to knowingly provide false, incomplete or misleading information to 
an insurance company for the purpose of defrauding the company. Penalties 
include imprisonment, fines and denial of insurance benefits.” 
If the claimants are not aware of the penalty for committing fraud, or that it is a crime to inflate 
insurance claims, this Warning legislation may mitigate moral hazard by increasing the social 
and psychic costs of fraud and the claimant’s subjective estimate of the cost of committing fraud. 
However, if claimants are already aware that exaggerating claims is illegal; these statutes will 
not be effective. 
  The second law, Mandatory Reporting, was used in 35 states in 1999 and requires 
insurance companies to report any suspected fraudulent claims to the proper authority. In most 
states, fraudulent claims are reported to either the State’s Insurance Fraud Bureau or the District 
Attorney. If insurers already report potentially fraudulent activities to the proper authorities, this 
law may merely ratify current behavior. In such a case, this statute would not affect moral 
hazard. If, however, prior to the enactment of this statute, insurers did not report suspected 
fraudulent behavior, and the public agencies have a comparative advantage in dealing with 
                                                      
3 Some states have enacted antifraud laws that only apply to workers compensation insurance. These laws 
are not included in our sample. Otherwise, antifraud laws apply to all types of insurance. 8 
insurance fraud, the law could mitigate moral hazard by increasing the probability that fraud is 
detected and punished. Alternatively, if insurers are better able to fight fraud privately, reporting 
suspected fraud to law enforcement officials may increase moral hazard by shifting the 
responsibility to the inferior party. 
  The third antifraud law, Special Investigation Unit (SIU), grew from 0 to 16 states and 
requires insurers in the state to take specific actions in investigating and reducing insurance 
fraud. Many of these statutes require that insurers create a special investigation unit to discover 
and prosecute fraudulent claims. Others require insurers to perform similar antifraud activities 
using existing claims staff, or by subcontracting outside investigators. This law attempts to 
mitigate moral hazard by increasing the probability of detecting fraud. To the extent that insurers 
already have Special Investigation Units or perform similar fraud detection activities prior to 
enactment of this law, the effect on moral hazard will be small. However, if the law increases 
insurers’ fraud detection efforts, it should mitigate moral hazard.  
  The fourth type of antifraud legislation, Felony, indicates that the state classifies 
insurance fraud as a felonious crime. By 1999, it was used in 35 states. The deterrent effect of 
prosecution is a function of the severity of penalties for committing insurance fraud. Although 
insurance fraud is a crime in all states, some states classify it as a misdemeanor that carries only 
a small fine for first time offenders while others classify it as a felony that carries greater fines 
and incarceration. Therefore, classifying insurance fraud as a felony should mitigate moral 
hazard by increasing the cost of committing fraud. 
  The fifth law, Fraud Bureau, requires the state to form an insurance fraud bureau to 
detect, investigate, and prosecute insurance fraud. Therefore, creating a bureau is intended to 9 
affect the expected utility of committing fraud by increasing the probability of detection and 
prosecution for fraud. By the end of our sample period bureaus existed in 35 states.  
  Because insurers often fund fraud bureaus, the creation of a fraud bureau may redistribute 
antifraud resources from private to public entities. If bureaus have a comparative advantage in 
reducing fraud, the creation of a bureau should reduce moral hazard. Anecdotal evidence also 
suggests a complementary relationship between public and private antifraud efforts. Insurance 
company representatives complain that state prosecutors are often unwilling to devote resources 
to prosecuting insurance fraud if the fraudulent claim was denied (IRC-ISO, 2001). Further, the 
survey results in IRC-ISO (2001) suggest that prosecutors are often unwilling to prosecute 
individual instances of insurance fraud. Establishing a fraud bureau may increase antifraud 
efforts by prosecutors and law enforcement officials, especially when prosecutors and 
investigators are assigned to the bureau. This would increase an insurer’s incentive to deny a 
fraudulent claim and to devote resources to the prosecution of fraud. If public and private 
antifraud efforts are complements, the creation of a bureau should reduce moral hazard.  
  Incomplete cross-sectional data suggest that fraud bureaus in some states may be less 
effective than others. If a fraud bureau does not have adequate resources it may be unable to 
affect moral hazard. The Coalition Against Insurance Fraud (2001) shows that fraud bureau 
resources and activity varied substantially across states in 2000. Fraud bureau budget per capita 
ranged from $3.07 in New Jersey to $0.06 in South Carolina. The number of claims referred to 
fraud bureaus ranged from 22,598 in California to 105 in Connecticut. Given this large variation 
in resources and activity, the ability of fraud bureaus to decrease fraud may vary significantly 
across states. Unfortunately, available data are inadequate to facilitate the inclusion of resources 
and activity of fraud bureaus in our empirical analysis. 10 
  The sixth law, License, requires prosecutors to report to the appropriate licensing 
authority any licensed professional who is convicted of or pleads no contest to insurance fraud. 
For example, attorneys are reported to the state’s Bar Association, physicians are reported to the 
Board of Medical Examiners, and insurance agents are reported to the state’s Department of 
Insurance. This law can mitigate moral hazard by increasing transaction costs of filing a 
fraudulent claim. The increased punishment for professionals involved in fraud should decrease 
the pool of physicians and attorneys willing to participate in such claims; increasing the 
claimant’s search costs. It should also increase the compensation demanded by professionals for 
committing a crime. This is the least commonly used of our antifraud laws and was enacted in 
only 7 states in 1999.  
  Statutory immunity is frequently mentioned as important for fraud control. However, 
because many states had immunity statutes that existed well in advance of our sample period and 
few states change this law during this period, we do not test the efficacy of immunity statutes.  
C. Tort Reform Legislation 
  In addition to antifraud laws, we investigate the effects of tort reforms on our dependent 
variable. We test four tort reforms, including limits on non-economic damages, limits on punitive 
damages, limits on joint and several liability, and modification of the collateral source rule 
because they can affect the frequency and severity of bodily injury liability losses.
4 They can 
affect severity directly by altering the outcome of bodily injury liability litigation, and can affect 
frequency indirectly by changing the expected value of filing a claim.
5 While most of these laws 
                                                      
4 We test these four tort reform laws because they are most likely to affect our dependent variable. ATRA 
also tracks changes in prejudgment reform, product liability reform, class action reform, attorney retention sunshine, 
appeal bond reform, and jury service reform. The only one of these that could significantly affect automobile 
insurance claims is jury service. However, none of these reforms were passed before 2003.  
5 Born and Viscusi (1994) and Viscusi et al. (1993) examine the response of the insurance market to 11 
were enacted in response to the liability insurance crisis of the 1980s, some reforms were enacted 
during our sample period when the number of states with such laws increased from 29 to 35 for 
joint and several liability, from 21 to 24 for collateral source rules, from 24 to 30 for punitive 
damage limits, and from 10 to 14 for limits on non-economic damages. The tort reform data are 
obtained from the American Tort Reform Association. 
  The first tort reform is legislation that limits damages awarded for non-economic losses 
including compensation for pain and suffering, emotional distress, loss of consortium or 
companionship, and other intangible injuries. These damages involve no direct economic loss 
and have no precise value. It is very difficult for juries to assign a dollar value to these losses, 
given the minimal guidance they customarily receive from the court. Several states have 
modified the rules for awarding non-economic damages by limiting the amount of damages or 
the circumstances under which they are available. Capping non-economic damages should 
decrease bodily injury liability losses in a state. Because caps are often set at $250,000 or higher, 
this law will not directly affect the severity of most automobile insurance losses. However, a cap 
on non-economic damages decreases a plaintiff’s incentive to file a lawsuit, and increases an 
insurer’s incentive to defend, rather than settle, a suit. 
  Punitive damages are awarded to punish the defendant, not to compensate the plaintiff. 
The possibility of collecting punitive damages increases the plaintiff’s expected value of civil 
litigation. Many states have passed laws that limit the opportunities for awarding punitive 
damages and restrict the amount of punitive damage awards. Although one might anticipate that 
punitive damage caps would have a large effect, punitive damages are not legally insurable in 
                                                                                                                                                                           
various liability reforms. They find that tort reform laws generally decrease insured losses, decrease insurance 
premiums, and increase insurance market profitability. 12 
many states.
6 In these states, a limitation on punitive damages would only deter filing a claim; it 
would not directly affect the amount of an insured loss. Further, in contrast to products or general 
liability litigation, in automobile liability litigation the defendant is more likely to be an 
individual rather than a corporation or business. As a result, the likelihood of punitive damages 
being awarded in automobile liability litigation would be lower and punitive damage caps would 
be expected to be less important. 
  Joint and several liability permits the plaintiff to recover damages from multiple 
defendants collectively, or from each defendant individually. In a state that follows the rule of 
joint and several liability, if a plaintiff sues three defendants, two of whom are 95 percent 
responsible for the defendant’s injuries, the plaintiff may recover 100 percent of her damages 
from the solvent defendant that is 5 percent responsible for her injuries (American Tort Reform 
Association, 2002). Thus, all else equal, a plaintiff in a state that recognizes joint and several 
liability is likely to receive a larger damage award through civil litigation. Many states have 
enacted laws limiting the application of joint and several liability. Several studies find evidence 
that joint and several liability reforms reduce the frequency and severity of liability losses 
(Viscusi, et al. 1993, and Lee, Browne, and Schmit, 1994). 
  Finally, the collateral source rule of common law says that the defendant cannot present 
evidence at trial to show that the plaintiff’s losses have been compensated from other sources 
such as health insurance or workers compensation insurance. Thus, a large percentage of 
economic damages awarded by juries may already have been paid to the plaintiff by another 
source. Many states have abolished or modified the collateral source rule. By allowing 
defendants to present evidence that plaintiffs have already received some compensation for 
                                                      
6 Examples of such are California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Utah.  13 
medical expenses, legislation that abolishes the collateral source rule of common law may reduce 
the damages awarded for bodily injury. All else equal, this would decrease our dependent 
variable. Unlike the two types of damage caps, this law can directly affect the outcome of large 
and small claims. 
  Tort reforms can affect our dependent variable by affecting both fraudulent and 
legitimate bodily injury claims. Our empirical analysis cannot distinguish between the effects of 
tort reforms on fraud and on other claims. However, these laws could mitigate moral hazard, and 
it is necessary to control for tort reforms when assessing the effects of antifraud laws.  
D. Demographic and Market Structure Variables 
  The last set of explanatory variables measures the structure of the automobile insurance 
market and demographic characteristics in a state. The first market structure variable is a 
measure of Personal Injury Protection (PIP). Under a no-fault insurance system each party’s 
insurer pays her own injuries, and bodily injury lawsuits are not allowed. The purpose of this 
system is to reduce the litigation costs inherent in a tort system. While pure no-fault systems do 
not exist in the United States, several states have enacted modified no-fault laws for automobile 
insurance. There are three observed variations of the modified no-fault system. The most 
restrictive form of modified no-fault insurance limits drivers’ rights to sue for bodily injury 
liability damages unless the damages exceed some threshold, and requires the purchase of first-
party coverage. This first-party coverage is known as Personal Injury Protection (PIP). Two 
types of thresholds are used to restrict an injured party’s ability to sue. If a state uses a verbal 
threshold, injuries must exceed a definition of severity included in the law, for example loss of a 
limb, before an injured party can sue for bodily injury. If a state uses a dollar threshold, medical 
cost resulting from the accident must exceed a dollar limit before the injured party can sue for 14 
bodily injury. In an “add-on” no-fault system, the state requires drivers to carry PIP coverage, 
but does not limit one’s ability to sue for bodily injury. Finally, in an elective PIP system, 
motorists can purchase PIP coverage, but it is not mandated by statute.
7  
  A recurring theme in the insurance fraud literature is that PIP may affect the level of 
fraud (Cummins and Tennyson, 1996; Carroll and Abrahamse, 2001; Tennyson and Salsas-Forn, 
2002). Cummins and Tennyson (1996) expect modified no-fault laws with verbal or dollar 
thresholds to reduce the ratio of bodily injury claims to property damage claims, but make no 
firm prediction regarding the effect of add-on and elective PIP laws. In states where one’s ability 
to sue for bodily injury is limited by no-fault laws, the frequency of bodily injury claims should 
decrease because PIP claims and bodily injury claims are mutually exclusive. However, because 
our dependent variable measures the amount paid for bodily injury and PIP claims in the 
numerator, the PIP variable in our model compares the relative expected net benefit
8 of 
submitting a fraudulent PIP claim to that of submitting a fraudulent third party claim for bodily 
injury bodily injury claim. 
  A decrease in the insurers’ ability to detect and deny fraud in PIP claims may increase the 
expected utility from submitting a fraudulent PIP claim. Insurance regulators in New York and 
other states have expressed concern that PIP coverage presents additional opportunities to submit 
fraudulent insurance claims (Hillman, 2002). In many states, insurers must pay or deny a first-
party insurance claim within thirty days of the claim’s submission to avoid a penalty under 
Unfair Claims Practices statutes. Moreover, to deny a claim on the basis of fraud, the insurer 
must be able to prove the fraud at the time it denies the claim. This effect is exacerbated by the 
                                                      
7 See Harrington (1994) for a detailed description of no-fault automobile insurance laws. 
8 The expected net benefit of submitting a fraudulent claim equals the expected value of the claim in excess 
of the fair value of damages multiplied by the probability that the fraudulent act will go unpunished, minus any fine 15 
insured’s option to wait up to six months before submitting a PIP claim in some states. After six 
months, evidence of common injuries such as soft tissue damage may have disappeared. In this 
situation, evidence of injury may be limited to the physician’s statement. For these reasons, we 
expect modified no-fault coverage to increase moral hazard by decreasing the probability that 
fraud will be detected and punished. This is consistent with a positive relationship between the 
percentage of PIP losses and our fraud proxy. To our knowledge, extant literature does not 
empirically test this hypothesis. 
  We measure the impact of modified no-fault coverage with the ratio of PIP losses to total 
bodily injury losses rather than with a dummy variable that captures the existence of the law for 
two reasons. First, there is very little change in the existence of no-fault laws during our sample 
period, but PIP losses vary considerable across states and years. Second, the ratio of PIP losses to 
total bodily injury losses reveals changes in the use of PIP coverage over time. This information 
is important because insurance regulators have expressed concern about a rising trend of fraud in 
PIP claims starting near the middle of our sample period. 
  The next market structure variable is the market concentration by state. The concentration 
of a state’s automobile insurance market should reduce fraud. It is common for insurers to 
allocate significant resources to detecting and denying fraudulent claims, but antifraud efforts 
across insurers are not uniform. Evidence suggests that large insurers are more likely than small 
insurers to participate in aggressive antifraud measures (IRC-ISO, 2001). Cummins and 
Tennyson (1996) contend that externalities of claims resistance by insurers in a given state, such 
as reductions in consumers’ expectations regarding the probability that a fraudulent claim will be 
paid, may be more beneficial to insurers with a larger market share in that state. Thus, there is 
                                                                                                                                                                           
or other decrease in utility from prosecution times the probability that the claimant will be found guilty of fraud. 16 
potential for a free-rider problem, where primarily the largest insurers expend resources to fight 
fraud. It is also possible that large insurers can achieve economies of scale in fraud detection and 
develop a reputation for fighting fraud. In a concentrated market, claimants are more likely to 
encounter a large insurer than they would in a less concentrated market. Following Cummins and 
Tennyson (1996) we do not expect market concentration to affect legitimate claims because 
denying legitimate claims exposes insurers to bad faith penalties and other punitive damages. To 
estimate these effects our model includes a measure of concentration, Market Concentration, in 
each state’s market for automobile insurance. This variable is a Herfindahl index of direct 
automobile insurance premiums written by insurers in each state calculated using data provided 
by the NAIC. Larger observations of this measure indicate a greater degree of market 
concentration in the state. Therefore, if moral hazard is less problematic in states with more 
concentrated markets, the market concentration will reduce the fraud proxy. 
  The last three variables in our model control for demographic factors that could affect a 
claimant’s expected utility from submitting a bodily injury claim. We include the natural 
logarithm of real per capita income as a control variable, but its theoretical relationship with 
fraud is ambiguous. Competing hypotheses suggest that per capita income could increase or 
decrease expected utility from submitting a claim. First, transaction costs of submitting a claim 
may be greater for higher income people because the opportunity cost of time is increasing in 
income. Furthermore, prior research suggests that higher income people face larger opportunity 
costs of time in committing crimes and higher penalties in the form of lost future wages if 
convicted (Lott 1992). Similarly, wealthier individuals should be less likely to engage in 
fraudulent insurance claiming behavior because marginal utility is decreasing in wealth 
(Cummins and Tennyson, 1996, p. 37). However, Danzon (1984) suggests that transaction costs 17 
of filing a claim could be decreasing in wealth if high income people are more familiar with the 
legal system than are low income people. Also, because one component of compensable 
damages is the lost wages of an injured claimant, individuals with greater income should be 
awarded greater damages. Because these effects work in different directions, the effect of per 
capita income is unclear.  
  Finally, we control for the unemployment rate and the percentage of a state’s population 
residing in metropolitan areas. In addition to possible wealth effects, we expect the transaction 
costs of filing a claim to be smaller for unemployed people and those living in metropolitan areas 
(Danzon, 1984, 1985). First, the opportunity costs of engaging in illegal activity are lower for 
unemployed people (Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard, 2002). Second, Cummins and Tennyson 
(1992, 1996) assert that observed automobile insurance claiming behavior in large metropolitan 
areas is different than that in other areas of a state. For example, the ratio of bodily injury claim 
frequency to property damage claim frequency in Philadelphia is more than three times higher 
than the rest of Pennsylvania. Similarly, this ratio is more than twice as high in New York City 
and Los Angeles than the respective state averages. This may be due in part to reduced search 
costs for the claimant in locating an attorney or physician. Furthermore, large-scale insurance 
fraud is often perpetrated by organized crime rings that are more likely to be found in large 
metropolitan areas (CAIF, 2004). 
   The U.S. Census Bureau is the source of data for unemployment, real per capita income, 
and the percentage of state population residing in metropolitan areas. Table 1 contains the 
summary statistics for the primary variables used in this study. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
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3. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
  We use two empirical strategies to determine the impact of laws on our fraud proxy—a 
base specification and a more sophisticated specification that includes time trends before and 
after the various laws are implemented.  
A. Base Specification 
  Model 1 uses dummy variables to indicate whether each law existed in a given state (i) 















      ( 1 )  
 The  variable  it FRAUD  proxies for insurance fraud in state i at time t.  ijt LAWS  contains 
the set of six antifraud laws and four tort reform measures discussed in Section 2. Coefficients 
are estimated for each of these ten laws ( 10 1− = j ). Fit is a vector of market structure variables 
in state i at time t, including logged income, unemployment, and urbanization. Time and state 
fixed effects,  t T  and  i S , control for unobserved time trends that affect all states in common and 
unobserved characteristics within states that are constant over time, respectively.  
  The coefficient estimates on the law variables are interpreted as the average effects of the 
law after it is in existence. It tests whether the fraud proxy is lower on average after the law is 
implemented than before the law. However, this simple test may be biased if the laws were 
adopted in response to changes in fraud. If states adopted these laws because fraud was 
increasing and the laws lowered fraud, the estimates underestimate the reduction in insurance 
fraud—the before and after averages would show little difference. For example, in Connecticut 
the fraud proxy increased by 48% between 1988 and 1991. Connecticut created a fraud bureau in 
1992 and the fraud proxy steadily decreased by 45% from 1992 until the end of our sample 19 
period. In the year before North Dakota passed antifraud legislation, the fraud proxy increased by 
28%. The following year it decreased by 24%. Likewise, if the laws were adopted when 
insurance fraud was declining, the bias would be in the opposite direction.  
B. Before and After Trends 
  A common approach to control for this type of endogeneity is to use instrumental 
variables. Valid instruments must be correlated with the decision to enact a change in the law but 
uncorrelated with the fraud proxy. Unfortunately, it is not technically feasible to use this 
approach because we would need at least six valid instruments to estimate the antifraud laws and 
four more to properly identify effects of the changes in the tort laws. Therefore, we use an 
alternative method that controls for before and after time trends for each law, as shown in 
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  By using this estimation technique we follow a growing literature that uses before and 
after time trends for each of the state laws.
9 Once we estimate these trends we can test whether 
the differences in the before and after trends are statistically significant. In addition to being 
technically feasible, this strategy has two other advantages. First, the coefficient estimates are 
easy to interpret—positive coefficient estimates on the before and after trends indicate that our 
fraud proxy was increasing before and after the laws were enacted. Second, it does not shorten 
the sample, as would the use of a series of leads and lags. Table 2 depicts the differences in the 
two estimation strategies.  
                                                      
9 Figure 4 allows comparison of the LAWS variables in Model 1 to the LAWSBEFORE and LAWSAFTER 
variables in Model 2. Others who have used this empirical technique to evaluate the impact of laws are Lott (1998), 
Mustard (2001), Plassman and Whitely (2003), and Grinols and Mustard (2004). 20 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
4. RESULTS 
  The results of the by-state regressions of Model 1 and Model 2 are presented in Tables 3 
and 4, respectively. The results associated with the wealth proxies are consistent with the 
previously stated hypotheses. The coefficient estimates of the urbanization variable in Model 1 
and the unemployment variable in Models 1 and 2 are significant and are positively related to our 
insurance fraud proxy, consistent with theory and prior empirical research. We argue that the 
significance of these variables provides indirect evidence of the appropriateness of our fraud 
proxy. 
  Table 3 presents the results of the basic regression (Model 1) described above. Two of the 
six antifraud laws are negative and statistically significant. The coefficient estimates for 
classification of insurance fraud as a felony and for revocation of licenses of professionals are 
negative and statistically significant, and indicate that these two laws reduce the insurance fraud 
proxy by 11.3 and 33.4 percentage points, respectively. The coefficient estimates for the other 
four laws—Mandatory Reporting, Warning, Special Investigation Unit, and Fraud Bureau—are 
not statistically different from zero. 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
  Three of the tort laws—modification of joint and several liability, caps on non-economic 
damages and caps on punitive damages—have statistically significant effects on the fraud proxy. 
States that cap non-economic damages and those that cap punitive damages display a higher 
value of the fraud proxy after the law, and those that eliminate the collateral source rule have less 21 
fraud after the law. All of these results are statistically significant; however, the results change in 
the specification that controls for changes in fraud before and after the laws are implemented.  
  The coefficient estimates for each of the market structure variables have the anticipated 
signs. However, there is no evidence supporting the hypothesis that firms with a greater share of 
the market have a greater benefit of expending resources to fight fraud. 
  The positive and highly statistically significant coefficient estimates on the PIP ratio 
suggests that there is an inflationary effect of no-fault coverage on claim costs. This is the 
opposite of Cummins and Tennyson’s (1996) result regarding the effect of no-fault laws on 
insurance claiming behavior, but it does not contradict their hypothesis. Cummins and Tennyson 
(1996) expect no-fault coverage to reduce the frequency of bodily injury claims because bodily 
injury claims and PIP claims are mutually exclusive. However, because our dependent variable 
measures the amount paid for bodily injury and PIP claims in the numerator, the PIP variable in 
our model compares the relative expected net benefit of submitting a fraudulent PIP claim to that 
of a bodily injury claim. Thus, our finding that the ratio of claims paid under PIP coverage 
increases the fraud proxy is consistent with suggestions in the trade press (Hillman, 2002) that 
regulation restricting the insurers’ ability to deny fraudulent PIP claims makes it easier for 
insureds to inflate PIP claims compared to other bodily injury claims.  
  The positive and statistically significant coefficient estimates on both the unemployment 
rate and the fraction of the population in metropolitan areas are consistent with the predictions 
that these groups may have lower transactions and opportunity costs of engaging in fraudulent 
activity. Because there are multiple and opposite effects of income on fraud, the sign of its 
coefficient estimate is uncertain. The empirical results show a slightly negative coefficient with a 
very high standard error, indicating that these opposing effects approximately offset each other.  22 
  Table 4 presents the results for the before and after trends (Model 2) and reports the 
results of whether the before and after trends differ. When we utilize the before and after time 
trend variables the results for the antifraud and tort reform laws are very different. We now find 
the strongest evidence that three of the antifraud laws reduce the fraud proxy. For the 
establishment of special investigation units, classification of insurance fraud as a felony and 
revocation of licenses of professionals who engage in fraud, we find a statistically significant 
decrease in our fraud proxy when considering the difference in the before and after time trends 
for each of these laws. However, laws requiring insurers to report suspected fraudulent claims 
show decreases before the law and slight decreases (not statistically significant) after the law is 
implemented. Although the lower after effect is not statistically significant on its own, the 
difference between the before and after trends is statistically significant and positive.  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
  To better understand the motivation for and interpretation of the Before and After Trends 
model (Model 2), it is useful to consider the differences in results produced by the two models. 
Model 1 compares the average fraud proxy before a law is enacted to the average after a law is 
enacted. Model 2 compares the rate of change in the fraud proxy before a law is enacted to the 
rate of change after a law is enacted. For example, the coefficient estimate for Special 
Investigation Unit in the Before and After Averages model (Model 1) is not statistically different 
from zero. Therefore, the average of the fraud proxy before the law is enacted is not significantly 
different from the average after the law is enacted. This test is biased if the fraud proxy was 
increasing before enactment and decreasing after enactment.  
  The same law produces different results in the Before and After Trends model (Model 2). 
The before trend coefficient indicates that, all else equal, the fraud proxy was increasing by an 23 
average of 0.048 per year before the law was enacted in states that enacted the law during our 
sample period. The after trend coefficient estimate indicates that the fraud proxy decreased by an 
average of 0.074 per year after the law was enacted. The F-value (17.91) tells us that the 
difference between the before and after coefficient estimates is statistically significant, and the 
magnitude of the difference suggests that this law reduced the insurance fraud proxy by .122 
annually. Thus, the Model 2 results are consistent with the notion that laws requiring Special 
Investigation Units mitigate moral hazard in automobile bodily injury claims by increasing the 
probability that insurance fraud will be detected. 
  Interpretations of the coefficient estimates for the other three laws displaying significant 
effects on fraud, License, Felony, and Mandatory Reporting, are slightly different from that of 
the Special Investigation Unit. Laws revoking the licenses of professionals involved in insurance 
fraud reduce the rate of change in the fraud proxy, which decreased by an average of 0.043 
annually before the law was enacted. After the law passed the average rate of change drops even 
lower to -0.132. The difference between the before and after coefficient estimates is significantly 
different from zero at the ten-percent confidence level (F-value=3.25), and the magnitude of the 
effect is equivalent to a .089 annual reduction in the fraud proxy. This evidence is consistent with 
the law decreasing moral hazard in automobile insurance by increasing the cost to the claimant 
of finding and hiring a physician or attorney who will participate in insurance fraud. 
  The classification of insurance fraud as a felony also decreases the rate of change in the 
fraud proxy. Although neither the before trend or after trend coefficient estimates are statistically 
different from zero, the difference between them is statistically different from zero at the ten-
percent confidence level (F-value=3.33). The magnitude of the effect is equivalent to a .03 
reduction in the fraud proxy per year. This evidence is consistent with the law decreasing moral 24 
hazard by increasing the cost of committing fraud. 
  Requiring insurers to report suspected insurance fraud to the proper authorities increases 
the rate of change in our fraud proxy. The before trend coefficient estimate indicates the fraud 
proxy was decreasing by an average of 0.071 per year before such laws were enacted. The after 
trend coefficient estimate is not significantly different from zero and the difference between the 
before and after estimates is significant at the five-percent level (F-value=4.05). The magnitude 
of the effect equates to a .049 annual increase in the fraud proxy. This evidence suggests that 
when states enact the mandatory reporting law, previously declining fraud rates stop declining. 
The result is consistent with our hypothesis that requiring insurers to report suspected fraud to 
the proper authorities may increase moral hazard by decreasing the probability of detecting and 
prosecuting fraud. One explanation for this result is that private antifraud efforts are more 
effective than are public efforts. 
  The difference between the before and after trend variables is not statistically significant 
for fraud warnings or the creation of a fraud bureau. As noted in Section 2, this result for fraud 
bureaus may indicate that public and private antifraud efforts offset each other. Alternatively, 
given the differences across bureaus in available resources and activity, some bureaus may 
decrease fraud, while others increase fraud, effectively canceling each other out in the empirical 
analysis. Available data do not facilitate an empirical test of this hypothesis. 
  We also find interesting results in the before and after trend analysis of the tort reform 
variables. Limiting non-economic damages has a statistically significant and negative effect on 
the fraud proxy. For limiting non-economic damages the difference between the before and after 
trend variables is significant at less than the one-percent level. There is some evidence that 
altering the collateral source rule and modifying joint and several liability increases the fraud 25 
proxy. Tort reforms involving punitive damages have no statistically significant before or after 
effects, consistent with Eaton, Mustard, and Talarico (2005) who find that the decision to seek 
punitive damages has not statistically significant effect on the majority of phases of the tort 
litigation process.  
  The results for our market structure variables are similar to those in Table 3. The positive 
and statistically significant coefficient estimate on the PIP ratio reinforces the belief that no-fault 
laws may inflate claim costs. The qualitative results for the other market variables are similar in 
the two specifications. While the metropolitan variable is not significant in this specification, 
states with high unemployment rates display a higher value of our fraud proxy. Per capita income 
has no effect in either specification. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
  In the face of growing concern over the economic and societal implications of insurance 
fraud, many have proposed a variety of steps to reduce insurance fraud. A popular approach to 
reduce insurance fraud has been the enactment of antifraud legislation in many states. The 
number of states with at least one antifraud statute has increased by more than three-fold since 
1988. In spite of the substantial increase in these laws, there are no thorough empirical analyses 
of their efficacy. 
  Not surprisingly, the evidence suggests that while some antifraud laws appear to have 
reduced insurance fraud, the effects of all laws are not equal. An important feature of our study is 
the unique methodology to control for trends in the fraud proxy before the laws were 
implemented. These estimates are consistent with laws being enacted while fraud was changing, 
thus biasing the results of the basic OLS specifications. Finally, the strongest evidence of fraud 26 
mitigation effects is associated with the mandatory Special Investigation Units, classification of 
insurance fraud as a felony, and mandatory reporting of professionals to licensing authorities. 
However, laws requiring insurers to report potentially fraudulent claims to law enforcement 
authorities increase fraud, which may reflect a tendency for this type of law to substitute less 
productive state activity for more efficacious private efforts that would have been undertaken in 
the absence of this mandate. 
  The tort reform laws also have mixed effects. Modification of joint and several liability 
and elimination of the collateral source rule are associated with an increase in our fraud proxy. 
Reforms on punitive damages have little effect on fraud. The most promising tort reform limits 
non-economic damages, which reduces the fraud proxy.  
 The  market  structure  variables  have very strong effects. States with a higher ratio of PIP 
claims have substantially higher values of the fraud proxy. This is consistent with our hypothesis 
that the expected net benefit from submitting a fraudulent PIP claim is greater than that from a 
bodily injury claim. The difference is likely due to statutory regulations that limit an insurer’s 
ability to deny PIP claims without facing significant bad faith penalties. Also, as expected, states 
with higher unemployment display substantially higher values of our fraud proxy.  
 27 
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Figure 2 
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Definition: Ratio of ratio of average loss cost per insured car for all injury coverages combined 
to average loss cost per insured car for property damage coverage. 
 






Deviation Minimum  Maximum 
Dependent Variable         
 Fraud  2.8219  0.9825  1.18  7.44 
        
Antifraud Laws        
 Warning  0.2200  0.4146  0  1 
 Mandatory Reporting  0.4300  0.4955  0  1 
 Special Investigation Unit  0.1117  0.3152  0  1 
 Felony  0.4183  0.4937  0  1 
 Fraud Bureau  0.3950  0.4893  0  1 
 License  0.0433  0.2038  0  1 
        
Tort Reform Laws        
 Cap on Non-economic Damages  0.2333  0.4233  0  1 
 Cap on Punitive Damages   0.5583  0.4970  0  1 
 Modification of Joint and Several Liability  0.6667  0.4718  0  1 
 Elimination of Collateral Source Rule  0.4650  0.4992  0  1 
        
Market Structure Variables         
 PIP Ratio  0.0935  0.1400  0.0000  0.7417 
 Market Concentration  0.0844  0.0239  0.0417  0.1914 
 Per Capita Income  21331  4371  11695  38560 
 Unemployment  5.4031  1.5554  2.2300  11.3900 





TABLE 2  
Comparison of Law Enactment Variables 
 
Year  LAWS 





1988  0 -6 0 
1989  0 -5 0 
1990  0 -4 0 
1991  0 -3 0 
1992  0 -2 0 
1993  0 -1 0 
1994 1  0  0 
1995 1  0  1 
1996 1  0  2 
1997 1  0  3 
1998 1  0  4 
1999 1  0  5 
 
Represents the three variables for a law enacted in 1994 
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Table 3 
Results from Model 1 




Estimate Standard  Error 
Changes in Laws—Antifraud Legislation    
 Warning  0.032  0.0566 
 Mandatory Reporting  -0.055  0.0525 
 Special Investigation Unit  -0.0743  0.0556 
 Felony  -0.1134*  0.0462 
 Fraud Bureau  0.0642  0.0467 
 License  -0.3341***  0.0687 
    
Changes in Laws—Tort Reform     
 Cap on Non-economic Damages  0.4005***  0.0865 
 Cap on Punitive Damages   0.2665**  0.0781 
 Modification of Joint and Several Liability  -0.1997  0.0892 
 Elimination of Collateral Source Rule  -0.4071***  0.1078 
    
Market Structure    
 PIP Ratio  2.525***  0.4705 
 Market Concentration  -3.7495  2.0176 
 Per Capita Income  -0.3753  0.5782 
 Unemployment  0.0816***  0.0156 
 Metropolitan  7.4615**  2.5496 
    
 Intercept  3.735  5.4569 
    
State Fixed Effects  Yes   
Year Fixed Effects  Yes   
    
R
2 .890   
Adjusted R
2 .874   
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level 
** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level  
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level 
Results for the state and time fixed effects variables are available from the authors. 
The dependent variable is the ratio of bodily injury liability losses incurred to property damage liability losses 




Results from Model 2 
Before and After Trends 
 









Error  F-Value 
Changes in Laws-Antifraud Legislation          
Warning -0.0072  0.0165  -0.0362*  0.0194    1.36 
Mandatory Reporting  -0.0705***  0.0175  -0.0219  0.0183   4.05** 
Special Investigation Unit  0.0483***  0.0167  -0.074***  0.0235   17.91*** 
Felony 0.0117  0.0131  -0.0181  0.0144    3.33* 
Fraud Bureau  -0.0078  0.0147  0.0218  0.0187   1.89 
License -0.043***  0.0145  -0.1318***  0.0437    3.25* 
          
Changes in Laws-Tort Reform          
Cap on Non-economic Damages  0.0321  0.0255  -0.0475***  0.0118  8.67*** 
Cap on Punitive Damages   0.0214  0.0275  -0.0123  0.011   1.34 
Modification of Joint and Several Liability  -0.093***  0.0293  -0.028**  0.0112   4.54** 
Elimination of Collateral Source Rule  -0.1128**  0.0567  0.03***  0.0109   6.09** 
          
Market Structure          
PIP Ratio  2.9403***  0.612       
Market Concentration  -2.8608  2.7979       
Per Capita Income  -0.5533  0.8226       
Unemployment 0.0933***  0.0203       
Metropolitan 4.4717  3.874       
          
Intercept 5.8103  7.7934      
          
State Fixed Effects  Yes    Yes     
Year Fixed Effects  Yes    Yes     
          
R
2 0.907         
Adjusted R
2  0.892             
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level 
** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level  
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level 
Results for the state and time fixed effects variables are available from the authors. 
The dependent variable is the ratio of bodily injury liability losses incurred to property damage liability losses incurred 
and proxies fraud. 
 
 